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Accuracy in forecasting macroeconomic 









This paper discusses accuracy in forecasting of macroeconomic time series in 
Iceland. Until recently only the National Economic Institute (NEI) did 
macroeconomic forecasting in Iceland. Extensive analysis of forecasting can therefore 
only be done for the forecasts made by this institution during 1974-2002.  
The paper analysis macroeconomic forecasts published by the Central Bank of 
Iceland (CBI). It also analysis the accuracy of the first realeases of data from Statistics 
Iceland as “forecasts” of final (or the most recent) data during recent years. Forecasts 
made by international institutions like OECD and IMF are not included.  
The paper finds that errors in forecasting of GDP and private consumption have 
declined and that the performance of the forecasting for these variables has improved 
on some measures. But the volatility in the series has also decreased so when the 
forecast errors are compared to measures of the shocks that hit the economy the 
forecasting of changes in GDP do not seem to have improved. For some of the main 
components of GDP like export, imports and investments, the forecast errors have not 
decreased. 
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In this paper we will study forecast errors and try to assess the quality of 
macroeconomic forecasting for annual changes in macroeconomic time series for the 
Icelandic economy during the last 30 years.
1 Different methods have been suggested 
to assess the quality of forecasts. One method is simply to look at some measure of 
the forecast errors themselves, e.g. the mean absolute forecast errors (MAFE), mean 
square forecast errors (MSFE) or the root mean square forecast errors (RMSFE). If 
these measures are declining then that means that forecasting is improving. Another 
method compares some measure of forecast errors to the same measure of errors from 
some naive forecasting method (zero change forecast as proposed by H. Theil
2 or last 
observed change, which is the optimal forecast if the changes follow random walk, or 
some other simple or naive forcasting method using the infromation available at the 
time of forcasting).  
In recent years researchers studying forecasts for the US economy have observed 
that errors in macroeconomic forecasts have been declining but errors in forecasts 
using simple or naive methods have also been declining. In some cases the latter have 
declined faster than the errors in serious macroeconomic forcasts done by private and 
public institutions causing a decline in the quality of these forecasts when compared 
to the forecasts using the naive methods.
3 
A third method compares some measure of the forecast errors to some measure of 
the shocks that the economy was subjected to during the forecast period, e.g. the 
standard deviation of the actual values of the variable that was forecasted or some 
other measure of such shocks. When assessing forecast errors in recent times this 
measure takes into account that for many developed economies there is evidence of a 
                                                 
1 Comparable studies for other economies usually study quarterly time series and forecasting of 
quarterly changes in these series. This is unfortunately not yet possible for Iceland as time series for 
quarterly national account data are only available from the first quarter of 1997. Time series for 
quarterly forecasts are much shorter as quarterly forecasts have only been made since the first quarter 
of 2006 when the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) started to use its quarterly model (QMM) in 
forecasting (See Daníelsson et al. 2006). In this paper we will therefore only study time series of 
changes in annual data and forecasts for such changes. 
2 For discussion of Theil’s proposals see Clements and Hendry (1998), pp. 63-65. 
3 See e.g. D’Agostino and Whelan (2007) and D'Agostino et al. (2007) and the references therein. 
D’Agostino and Whelan (2007) find that the advantage in forecasting by the US FED that Romer and 
Romer (2000) found has disappeared, except in forecasting of inflation in the very near term, especially 
the current quarter.  3
significant reduction in the volatility of the shocks in the macroeconomic time series, 
the so-called great moderation.
4 
Theoretically one should compare the forecast errors to the shocks that are 
unforeseeable at the time of forecasting. An efficient (optimal) forecast is one where 
the forecast errors are orthogonal (i.e. uncorrelated) to the information available at the 
time of forecasting. Estimations of this kind of efficiency of actual forecasts is quite 
difficult. We will therefore simply assume that some measure of the volatitlity in the 
series that is to be forecasted, e.g. the standard deviation of the relative changes in the 
series, or some measure of the aggregate volatility of the shocks that hit the economy, 
e.g. the standard deviation of the changes in the Gross National Income (GNI), is 
proportional to the unforeseeable shocks that the Icelandic economy was subjected to 
during the relevant period of time. In this case it is reasonable to nomalise the RMSFE 
with the standard deviations of changes in GDP or in GNI in relevant periods to 
obtain measures that can be used to compare forecast performances over time. 
Some economists (see e.g. D’Agostino and Whelan 2007) argue that the great 
moderation, i.e. the reduction in the volatility in macroeconomic variables (and 
inflation), was caused by better economic policies. If these improved economic 
policies react to predictable shocks to macroeconomic variables they reduced the 
overall volatility by reducing predictable shocks. In this case the improved economic 
policies create a situation where a larger share of the smaller overall variability is 
unpredictable. In this case normalising RMSFE with the standard deviations of 
changes in the GDP or in the GNI will not produce a reasonable measures for 
comparing forecast performances over time. 
Forecasting performance of NEI has been studied previously in three papers: 
Felixson and Gudmundsson (1988), Sighvatsson (1996) and Ólafsdóttir (2006). The 
last study covers the period from 1980 to 2002 when NEI was abolished. The 
differences between this study and the above mentioned studies are that we make 
formal tests of the bias in the forecasts and find that it is often significant. This means 
that the forecasts do not meet the first requirement of what has been called the weak 
form of informational efficiency.
5 We find that the forecasts meet the second 
                                                 
4 See e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson 
(2002) on the great moderation in the US and Stock and Watson (2003) and Summers (2005) on the 
great moderation in other countries. See Giannone et al. (2007) for the view that the shocks have not 
become smaller. See Daníelsson (2008) on the great moderation in Iceland. 
5 See e.g. Öller and Barot (1999) and the references therein.  4
requirement of no autocorrelations in the forecast errors. Details of the testing for 
autocorrelations are not reported in this paper. 
We also study correlations between forecast errors for the different components of 
GDP and relate the forecasting performances to the volatility in the Icelandic 
macroeconomic data which has been studied recently in Daníelsson (2008). Finally, 
we have included analysis of forecasting performances of the CBI and of the first 
releases of national account data from Statistics Iceland. 
This paper is organized so that Section 2 discusses the methodology in assessing 
accuracy of forecasts. Section 3 discusses errors in macroeconomic forecasts made by 
the National Economic Institute (NEI) during 1974-2002. Section 4 discusses errors in 
macroeconomic forecasts published in CBI’s Monetary Bulletin during 1999-2007. 
Section 5 discusses errors in the first releases of national account data from Statistics 




If  t F  is the value of some variable in time t forecasted at some earlier date and  t A  is 
the measured value of the variable in time t then the forecast error is  t t t A F e − = . 
For assessing the overall performance of forecasting we need some function that 
aggregates these forecast errors. Ideally the weights of the different forecast errors 
should reflect the costs of making the mistakes. Unfortunately, it is only rarely that 
such costs are available. In this situation it is reasonable
6 to use simple aggregating 
functions that have convenient mathematical properties like Mean Square Forecasting 
Error (MSFE =  () ∑ −
2 1
t t A F
H
 where H  is the number of observations on the 
forecast errors) or Root Mean Square Error (RMSFE = () ∑ −
2 1
t t A F
H
) to assess 
forecasting accuracy. Some researchers use the Mean Absolute Forecast Error 
(MAFE ∑ − = t t A F
H
1
) to avoid giving too much wheight to few very large forecast 
errors. 
                                                 
6 See Clements and Hendry (1998) p. 67.  5
Clements and Hendry (1998), chapter 3, explains some difficulties in using these 
measures to assess forecasting accuracy in some circumstances.
7 We will ignore these 
difficulties and use RMSFE below to assess forecast accuracy. 
One method to assess the quality of a forecast is to compare the RMSFE of the 
forecasts to the RMSFE from some naive forecasting method. If the naive methods 
gives the forecasts 
n
























U        ( 2 . 1 )  
 
is a measure of the relative efficiency of the forecasting method producing  t F  relative 
to the naive forecasting method. Lower  n U  means that the forecasting is relatively 
better and a forecast where  n U = 0 is a forecast where all forecast errors are zero, i.e. 
where  t A F t t ∀ = , . If the RMSFE of the forecasts is larger than the RMSFE of the 
simple forecast then  n U >1. Good forecasts should therefore have a value of relative 
efficiency,  n U , well below 1. 
H. Theil proposed Theil’s U  (or  2 U  as he called it to distinguish it from the first 













U       ( 2 . 2 )  
The term in the denominator can be considered as a way to normalize the root 
square forecast error (RSFE) in the nominator to make these measures comparable. 
But if the intention is to compare different forecasting methods by measuring the 
forecast errors for the same variable over the same period of time then this 
                                                 
7 In Section 3.4.2 they point out that choosing the model with smallest MSFE is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for a model to have constant parameters nor provide accurate forecasts and that in scalar 
processes, choosing the model with smallest MSFE will not ensure forecast encompassing. In Section 
3.5 they explain that the MSFE-based measures of forecast accuracy are not invariant to different but 
isomorphic representations of the same system.  6
normalisation is not necessary because it involves division with the same 
denominator, ∑
2
t A .  
When data do not have a specific unit, as is the case with data on relative changes 
or log differences which we are concerned with in this paper,  RMSFE is also unit-
free. Different units are therefore not an obstacle for comparing RMSFEs. In this 
situation the only purpose of normalising RMSFEs for different variables is to obtain 
a measure of forecasting accuracy that takes into account that for some reasons it is 
not equally difficult to forecast the variables during different periods of time. The aim 
of the normalisation should then be to compensate for these differences. 
It is easy to see that Theil’s  2 U  can be derived from equation (2.1) by using the 
naive forecast  t F
n
t ∀ = , 0.  
Theil proposed the following docomposition of the MSFE: 
 
() () ( ) A F A F
H
h






2 1    (2.3) 
 
where  h t h t h T A F e + + + − = ,  X  is the average value and  X S  is the standard deviation of 
some variable  X  and r  is the sample correlation coefficient for F  and  A.  Theil 
interpreted the first term as indicating the bias in the forecasts, the second term as 
indicating the bias in the forecasting of the standard deviation of the series and the 
third term as the random part or the covariance proportion. Standardizing the sum 

















A F A F A F      (2.4) 
 
Granger and Newbold (1973) show that this decomposition can be misleading for the 
optimal predictor in simple time series models. They prefer a second decomposition 
that Theil proposed, namely: 
 
() () ()
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 A A F h T S r rS S A F e H MSFE − + − + − = = ∑ +
−    (2.5) 
  7
as “the formulation of the last two terms implies that the second should now tend to 
zero (along with the first) for a good forecast, leaving the third term to approach unity 
after scaling.” (Clements and Hendry, 1998, p. 65). 
If the forecasting errors are independent and nomally distributed then it is possible 
to test if the bias is significant by using that in this case  ()











has a t-distribution with  1 − H  degrees of freedom. 
If the forecasting errors are not independent or identically normally distributed 
then this test will be biased. Various alternatives have been proposed. Öller and Barrot 
(1999, p. 112) propose to estimate the univariate process of the forecasting errors and 
test if the constant is significant. Another way to solve the problem of autocorrelation 
which solves the problem of heterocedasticity as well is to use Newey-West standard 
deviations that are robust to both autocorrelation and heterocedasticity. We will use 
this latter method below. 
All these methods depend on the assumption that the errors are normally 
distributed. In most cases discussed below this assumption is not rejected. In spite of 
this we will also use the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test to test for biases. This test 
demands that the errors are independent draws from a continuous and symmetric 
population but not that they are normally distributed. 
It is obviously interesting to see if the forecasting errors are increasing, decreasing 
or constant over time. This can be done by regressing some measure of forecasting 
accuracy on a time trend. It is also interesting to see how forecasters are performing in 
relation to the variability of the variable that is to be forecasted. If the variability is 
large then one would expect RMSFE to be high because it is easier to forecast 
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   (2.6) 
 
where SD is the standard deviation of the variable that is forecasted. It follows 
directly from (2.6) that  ≥ SD RMSE 2 U .  8
SD RMSE  is also the relative forecasting efficiency of the forecast against the 
naive forecast of  A F
n
t = . This forecast is optimal (in the sense of minimising 
RMSFE) in the class of forecasts  =
n
t F constant,  t ∀ , which includes Theil’s naive 
forecast of  =
n
t F 0. But as the average value of the variable,  A , is not known at the 
time of the forecasting it gives a bias against some actual forecasts that uses only the 
information available at the time of forecasting to compare them with the forecast 
A F
n
t = . On the other hand, it may seem to give actual forecasts done at the time an 
unjust advantage when they are compared to the naive alternative  0 =
n
t F . Usually it 
is known when changes in macroeconomic variables are forecasted that the average 
changes will be above zero, which means that Theil’s naive forecasts are biased.  
One naive forecast method that would do better than Theil’s method of  0 =
n
t F  in 
many cases is to use the latest known (at the time of the forecasting) estimate of the 
variable. This forecasting method is optimal if the time series follows random walk. 
Using the average value of the variable for some recent period known at the time of 
the forecasting gives unbiased forecasts in the case where the parameters of the data 
generating process are stable. 
Ólafsdóttir (2006) compares NEI’s forecasts to forecasts from equations she 
obtains by estimating univariate AR(2) models for changes in GDP. For forecasting 
GDP in year  1 + t  she uses a model estimated from data for the period from 1945 to 
year  t. Because of frequent and large data revisions one should only use data that 
were available at the time of forecasting in these estimations. Ólafsdóttir finds that for 
the periods 1981-2002 and 1992-2002 the forecasts from the AR(2) models are 
inferior to NEI’s forecasts for year  1 + t  made in the autumn of year t. 
Pétursson (2000) estimates AR(2) model and Markov-switching model where the 
trend component in the time series (or the constant in the autoregressive equation for 
the first difference of the series) follows a markovian two states process. When 
considering the period 1991-1998 Pétursson finds that in one-year ahead out-of-
sample forecasts the Markov-switching model performs better than both the AR(2) 
model and NEI when the forecasts are compared in terms of mean absolute errors, 
while NEI’s forecasts perform best if the Root Mean Square Error is used. Pétursson 
finds that for the period 1993-1998 NEI’s forecasts perform much worse than the 
forecasts from the AR(2) model and the forecasts from the Markov-switching model  9
independently of the measure chosen for comparing the forecasts, while the Markov-
switching model performs best. 
Ólafsdóttir (2006) and Pétursson (2000) discuss performances of the different 
forecasting methods in terms of forecasting turning points of the Icelandic business 
cycle and direction of changes in the variables. These aspects of the forecasts will not 
be discussed in this paper. 
 
3. Errors in NEI’s forecasts 
 
Except for a few of the very last years of its existence from 1974 to 2002 NEI was the 
only institute in Iceland making macroeconomic forecasts. The institute was obliged 
by law to make forecasts that were used in the planning for state budget and published 
in the National Budget (Þjóðhagsáætlun) in the beginning of October each year. 
These forecasts were based on the information available in September in a given year. 
Most of the times NEI also published forecasts in the National Economy 
(Þjóðarbúskapurinn) or in On the National Economy (Ágrip úr þjóðarbúskapnum) 
that was published in March/April.  
In the beginning NEI’s macroeconomic forecasts were made with very simple 
models. The first rigorous model that NEI used in its forecasting was completed in 
1989 and used to prepare the forecast published in the spring of that year.
8 
Table 3.1 below shows some statistics on errors in the forecasts for annual growth 
in GDP for the next year that were published in the National Budget.
9 The second 
column shows the average forecast error,  t t A F − . The negative sign indicates that the 
actual growth in GDP (GNP) was on average larger than forecasted. 
 
                                                 
8 In Þjóðhagsstofnun (1989) there is a brief description of this model. A more complete account can be 
found in Baldursson (1990). 
9 or GNP as NEI forecasted changes in GNP until 1983 (forecasting for 1984) when it started to 
forecast changes in GDP.  10
Table 3.1 
Errors
1) in the National Budget (Þjóðhagsáætlun, September in year t-1) forecasts of changes in GDP (%) 
  Av.   St.dev. St.dev.  RMSFE/ RMSFE/ Theil's  P-value  Wilc. 
 error  RMSFE  D(GDP)  D(GNI)  St.d.(GDP)  St.d.(GNI)  U  One  tail  test
2) 
1974-1986  -2.95 3.75 3.13 4.83  1.20  0.78 0.76  0.032  ** 
1987-2002  -1.58 2.84 3.05 3.59  0.93  0.79 0.74  0.034  ** 
              
1977-1993  -2.42 3.59 3.63 4.53  0.99  0.79 0.79  0.026  ** 
1981-1993  -1.76 3.05 3.40 4.22  0.90  0.72 0.81  0.065  ** 
1994-2002  -1.87 2.79 2.11 2.14  1.33  1.30 0.68  0.068  * 
              
1977-1994  -2.63 3.79 3.53 4.40  1.07  0.86 0.84  0.017  ** 
1981-1994  -2.08 3.38 3.30 4.07  1.02  0.83 0.90  0.041  * 
1995-2002  -1.33 1.99 2.25 2.26  0.88  0.88 0.48  0.094  * 
              
1977-2002  -2.23 3.34 3.16 3.87  1.06  0.86 0.76  0.007  ** 
1981-2002  -1.81 2.95 3.01 3.62  0.98  0.81 0.76  0.015  ** 
              
1974-1993  -2.34 3.48 3.52 4.76  0.99  0.73 0.77  0.020  ** 
1974-2002  -2.19 3.28 3.12 4.14  1.05  0.79 0.75  0.005  ** 
1) Errors compared to the most recent (March 2008) national account estimates     
2) One sided test Wilcoxon's rank sum test; * = significant at 5%, ** = significant at 1% level.   
 
The third column shows the RMSFE. For comparison the fourth column shows the 
standard deviation of changes in GDP (GNP until 1983) and the fifth column shows 
the standard deviation of changes in GNI. The sixth column shows the ratio of 
RMSFE and the standard deviation of changes in GDP which is used as a measure of 
the shocks that hit the Icelandic economy during the relevant time period and the 
seventh column shows the ratio of RMSFE and the standard deviation of changes in 
GNI as a measure of the shocks, including the terms of trade shocks. The eighth 
column shows the U2 statistic that H. Theil proposed. The second last column shows 
p-values for one-tailed t-tests for the significance of the biases of the forecasts. 
Newey-West standard deviations are used so that the results are robust for 
autocorrelations and heteroscedasticity but depend on the assumption of normal 
distribution. An alternative test of the significance of the biases that does not rely on 
the assumption of normal distribution is the non-parametric Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test. 
The last column in shows significance of the bias in a one-tailed Wilcoxon’s test. 
Table 3.1 shows the different values calculated for the whole sample 1974-2002 
and for several subsamples. In the first two lines the sample is split into two samples 
of almost equal size. For the latter period, 1987-2002, the average error is much lower 
than in the former, and the RMSFE is also much lower but Theil’s U2 statistic is 
almost equal. The reason for this is that the denominator in Theil’s U2 statistic, the  11
square root of the sum of squares of actual growth in GDP, is much larger in the 
earlier period. 
The standard deviation of changes in GDP is almost the same for the two 
subsamples while the standard deviation of changes in GNI is much lower in the latter 
subsample. If the RMSFEs are normalised with the standard deviations of changes in 
GDP the normalised measure of forecast quality indicates improvement in the latter 
period, while if the RMSFEs are normalised with the standard deviations of changes 
in GNI the normalised measure of forecast quality indicates no improvement in line 
with the U2 statistic. 
Daníelsson (2008) estimates a breakpoint in the volatility of GNI in 1977. For that 
reason Table 3.1 contains analysis of subsamples starting in 1977. The sample period 
1977-2002 is divided into subsamples before and after 1994 to see if forecasting 
improved after the inflation had been contained in the early 1990s. Besides showing 
the various statistics for the periods 1977-1993, 1994-2002 and 1977-2002 Table 3.1 
also shows statistics for 1977-1994 and 1995-2002. The reason for including results 
for the period 1995-2002 is that Daníelsson (2008) finds a breakpoint in the volatility 
in fishing and fish processing, the traditional source of business cycle fluctuations in 
Iceland, in 1995. Including results for both 1994-2002 and for 1995-2002 in Table 3.1 
shows how sensitive the statistics on forecast errors are to individual observations. 
Because the samples are relatively small even one year with exceptionally large 
forecast error like 1994 causes large changes in the statistics in the table. If 1994 is in 
the later sample Theil’s U2 shows a small improvement in forecasting accuracy from 
0.79 in 1977-1993 (or 0.81 in 1981-1993) to 0.68 in 1994-2002, but if 1994 is in the 
first sample Theil’s U2 shows a large improvement from 0.84 in 1977-1994 (or 0.90 in 
1981-1994) to 0.48 in 1995-2002. RMSFEs normalised with the standard deviation in 
changes in GDP increases when 1994-2002 is compared to periods ending in 1993 
while it decreases a bit when 1995-2002 is compared to periods ending in 1994. 
RMSFEs normalised with standard deviations of changes in GNI do not indicate any 
improvement in the forecasting over time. 
Table 3.1 shows results for periods starting in 1981 rather than 1977. Ólafsdóttir 
(2006) uses this sample in her study of the forecasting performance of NEI during  12
1981-2002.
10 When studying the errors in the forecasting of the components of GDP 
below we will also use the sample starting in 1981. 
Table 3.2 shows the same statistics as Table 3.1 for the forecasts of changes in 
GDP (GNP) in a given year that NEI published in the National Economy. These 
forecasts were prepared during March/April of the same year. It is therefore to be 
expected that these forecasts are better than the forecasts made roughly 6 months 
earlier and published in the National Budget. It is therefore a bit surprising that the 
forecasts in the National Economy are much worse than those in the National Budget 
for the period 1974-1986. The average forecast error and the RMSFE is larger. The 
errors in the forecasts in the National Economy are also larger for the period 1977-
1993 but the difference is small. For the samples covering the most recent years the 
forecasts in the National Economy are much better than the forecasts in the National 
Budget as is to be expected. 
 
                                                 
10 Ólafsóttir (2006) divides the sample into two subsamples of equal size 1981-1991 and 1992-2002. 
There is a slight difference between the results in Table 3.1 and the result in Ólafsdóttir (2006) because 
we use more recent estimates from Statistics Iceland of changes in GDP (GNP) than she did and 
because we have taken into account the slight differences caused by the fact that NEI forecasted annual 
changes in GNP rather than GDP until 1983 when it forecasted the change in GDP for the year 1984.  13
Table 3.2 
Errors
1) in the National Economy, March/April in year t, forecasts of changes in GDP (%) 
 Av.    RMSFE/  RMSFE/  Theil's  P-value  Wilc. 
 error  RMSFE  St.d.(GDP)  St.d.(GNI)  U  one  tail test
2) 
1974-1986  -3.05 4.40  1.40  0.91  0.90  0.064  ** 
1987-2002  -1.12 2.24  0.73  0.62  0.58  0.039  * 
             
1977-1993  -2.27 3.35  0.92  0.74  0.75  0.036  ** 
1981-1993  -2.11 2.83  0.83  0.67  0.75  0.041  ** 
1994-2002  -1.00 2.19  1.04  1.02  0.54  0.102   
             
1977-1994  -2.40 3.45  0.98  0.78  0.78  0.026  ** 
1981-1994  -2.29 3.00  0.91  0.74  0.80  0.029  ** 
1995-2002  -0.53 1.63  0.72  0.72  0.39  0.197   
             
1977-2002  -1.83 2.97  0.94  0.77  0.69  0.014  ** 
1981-2002  -1.65 2.59  0.86  0.71  0.66  0.015  ** 
             
1974-1993  -2.43 3.68  1.05  0.77  0.84  0.031  ** 
1974-2002  -1.99 3.24  1.04  0.78  0.76  0.013  ** 
1) Errors compared to the most recent (in March 2008) national account estimates 
2) One sided test Wilcoxon's rank sum test; * = significant at 5%, ** = significant at 1% level. 
 
Theil’s U2 statistic in Table 3.2 indicates that the quality of NEI’s forecasts has 
improved over time while the standardised RMSFEs’ indicate improvement if 1994 is 
in the first period but deterioration if it is in the latter period. 
The second last column shows p-values for one-tailed t-tests for the bias in the 
forecasts using Newey-West standard deviations and the last  column shows the 
significance of the bias in a one-tailed Wilcoxon’s test. 
Table 3.3 shows some measures of the quality of NEI’s forecasts for the main 
macroeconomic variables for 1981-2002. The sample has been divided into two 
subsamples, 1981-1994 and 1995-2002. The table shows that the RMSFE of the 
forecasts was substantially lower in the latter period in the case of GDP and private 
consumption, but it was actually higher in the case of investments and imports. 
Theil’s U2 is lower in the latter period than in the former period in all cases, indicating 
better forecasting, but the difference is very small in the case of export but fairly large 
in the case of private consumption and especially in the case of GDP. 
  14
Table 3.3 
Statistics indicating forecast errors (%)    
Av.  error  GDP/GNP  C I X  M 
1981-1994  -2.08 -2.88  -2.08 -1.14  -2.26 
1995-2002  -1.33 -1.12  -8.32 -1.87  -4.83 
1981-2002  -1.81 -2.24  -4.35 -1.40  -3.19 
         
RMSFE         
1981-1994  3.38 5.47  7.65 6.33  7.78 
1995-2002  1.99 3.24  14.68 5.12  8.97 
1981-2002  2.95 4.78  10.75 5.92  8.23 
         
RMSFE/St.d.(relevant variable)      
1981-1994  1.02 0.92  0.93 1.04  0.85 
1995-2002  0.88 0.72  0.90 1.43  0.88 
1981-2002  0.98 0.87  0.89 1.11  0.85 
         
RMSFE/St.d.(changes in GNI)      
1981-1994  0.83 1.34  1.88 1.55  1.91 
1995-2002  0.88 1.43  6.51 2.27  3.98 
1981-2002  0.81 1.32  2.97 1.63  2.27 
         
Theil's U2         
1981-1994  0.90 0.90  0.96 0.99  0.87 
1995-2002  0.48 0.56  0.87 0.93  0.77 
1981-2002  0.76 0.80  0.90 0.97  0.82 
         
p-values of t-statistics       
1981-1994  0.041 0.060  0.174 0.255  0.142 
1995-2002  0.102 0.250  0.147 0.177  0.153 
1981-2002  0.015 0.038  0.060 0.138  0.054 
         
Significance of bias. Wilcoxon's signed rank sum test   
1981-1994  *  *     
1995-2002  *   almost  *   almost  * 
1981-2002  **  * almost  *   almost  * 
* = significance at 5% level, ** = signficance at 1% level. 
One sided tests.         
 
RMSFE normalised with the standard deviation of the variable that was forecasted 
shows some improvements in the forecasting of GDP and especially of private 
consumption even if the improvements are not as dramatic as when measured with 
Theil’s U2. This measure indicates that NEI’s forecasts for investments and imports 
were roughly equally good in the two period while the forecasts of exports were much 
worse in the latter period than in the former one. 
If terms of trade shocks are taken into account by normalising RMSFE with the 
standard deviation of changes in GNI, then there is deterioration in the forecasting 
performance in the latter period compared to the former one.  15
The last two sections in Table 3.3 shows signifcance of the biases in the forecasts. 
The p-values for the t-statistics (using Newey-West standard deviations) gives some 
indication of the biases. These tests give similar results as the Wilcoxon’s rank sum 
tests. The results show that the biases in the forecasting of changes in GDP were 
significant in both subperiods and there are strong indications of negative biases in 
several other cases. In spite of the fact that the average errror in the forecasts for 
changes in investments in the period 1995-2002 is -8.3% it is not quite significant at 
the 5% level in a one-tailed test. 
The large reduction in the errors in the forecasting of GDP is largely due to the 
reduction in the errors in the forecasting of private consumption. But at the same time 
as the forecasting of private consumption improves there is relatively small reduction 
in the errors of forcasting export (and a deterioration of the forecasting performance 
when the large reduction in the volatility in the series is taken into account) and 
increases in the forecasting errors of imports and investments. This indicates that 
some of the reason for the increased forecasting accuracy in the case of changes in 
GDP is that the correlations of the forecasting errors of the components of GDP have 
changed. Table 3.4 shows the correlations coefficients for the forecasting errors of 
GDP and its main components on the expenditure side, except government 
consumption. 
The table shows very high correlations between the errors in the forecasts for 
changes in private consumption and in the forecasts for changes in investment on the 
one hand and in the forecasts for imports on the other. These high correlations help to 
lower the errors in the forecasting of changes in GDP. 
Table 3.4 shows that the correlation between investment and imports is higher in 
the period 1995-2002 than in the period 1981-1994 while the correlation between 
export and consumption is lower (negative) during the latter periods. In other cases 
the correlations change so as to increase rather than decrease the errors in the 
forecasting of changes in GDP when it is forecasted by the formula 
t t t t t t M X I G C Y − + + + = .  
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Table 3.4 
Correlations of forecast errors 1981-2002    
  GDP/GNP C  I  X  M 
GDP/GNP  1.000 0.651 0.502 0.370  0.499 
C  0.651 1.000 0.609  -0.124  0.815 
I  0.502 0.609 1.000  -0.150  0.830 
X  0.370 -0.124 -0.150  1.000  -0.002 
M  0.499 0.815 0.830  -0.002  1.000 
        
Correlations of forecast errors 1981-1994    
  GDP/GNP C  I  X  M 
GDP/GNP  1.000 0.745 0.701 0.325  0.629 
C  0.745 1.000 0.830  -0.013  0.903 
I  0.701 0.830 1.000  -0.313  0.795 
X  0.325 -0.013 -0.313  1.000  0.066 
M  0.629 0.903 0.795 0.066  1.000 
        
Correlations of forecast errors 1995-2002    
  GDP/GNP C  I  X  M 
GDP/GNP  1.000 0.142 0.593 0.644  0.335 
C  0.142 1.000 0.731  -0.467  0.873 
I  0.593 0.731 1.000  -0.020  0.917 
X  0.644 -0.467 -0.020  1.000  -0.190 
M  0.335 0.873 0.917  -0.190  1.000 
        
Correlations of forecasted and actual changes   
  GDP/GNP C  I  X  M 
1981-1994  0.547 0.619 0.376 0.118  0.642 
1995-2002  0.715 0.809 0.659  -0.212  0.715 
1981-2002  0.611 0.617 0.578 0.070  0.699 
 
The last section in Table 3.4 shows the correlations between the forecasted 
changes and the actual changes. The poor forecasting of export can be seen from the 
almost zero correlations between the forecasted changes in export and the actual 
changes. On this measure the forecasts in the period 1995-2002 were actually poorer 
than those in 1981-1994. 
Some researcher studying the US economy (See e.g. D’Agostino and Whelan 
2007 and D’Agostino et al. 2007) have documented that even if errors in serious 
economic forecasts have been declining in recent years, errors in naive forecasts have 
been declining faster so that the forcasting performances of the serious forecasts have 
been deteriorating when compared to the naive forecasts. This is true for forecasts 
prepared by both public institutions (the FED) and private forecasters. It is suggested 
that this phenomena is connected to the reduction in the volatility of macroeconomic 
variables, the great moderation. 
Daníelsson (2008) documents the existence of a reduction in the volatility of some 
macroeconomic variables in Iceland. It is shown that there are significant breakpoints  17
in GDP, GNI, terms of trade and exports in the 1970s. It also documents a breakpoint 
in the volatility in fishing and fish processing in 1995. Except for the last one these 
breakpoints are a bit too early to be relevant for this study of forecast errors in 
Iceland. 
Table 3.5 shows standard deviations of changes in macroeconomic variables in the 
periods considered in Tables 3.1-3.4 above. The table shows that the volatility of 
GDP, private consumption, government consumption and exports is lower during 
1995-2002 than during earlier periods included in the table.  
 
Table 3.5 
Standard deviations of changes (%)     
  GDP C  G  I  X  M 
1981-1994  3.22  5.98 2.42  8.25 6.11 9.15 
1995-2002  2.25  4.51 1.54  16.35 3.58  10.20 
1981-2002  2.94  5.47 2.14  12.04 5.32 9.63 
          
1974-1986  2.81  6.05 2.62  7.92 6.65 8.97 
1987-2002  3.05  5.88 1.76  13.49 4.57  10.55 
          
1977-1994  3.43  6.01 2.37  8.54 6.29 9.16 
 
Some of these differences are close to being significant on an F-test for equal 
variances even if observations are very few (e.g. changes in export between 1981-
1994 and 1995-2002 with a p-value of 0.081) but others are further away from being 
significant on the usual 5% level. 
Table 3.5 shows also that the volatility in fixed investments and in imports was 
actually larger in 1995-2002 than during earlier periods. 
The RMSFE of forecasting for GDP and private consumption is substantially 
lower for the period 1995-2002 than in earlier periods. These forecasts also score 
better on Theil’s U2 and marginally better on the RMSFE/St.dev. measure.
11 For 
export and import no improvement can be seen and the forecasting of investment had 
actually higher RMSFE in 1995-2002 than in earlier periods. As the volatility was 
also higher in 1995-2002 there are only small differences in RMSFE/St.dev. 
 
4. Errors in Central Bank of Iceland’s forecasts 
 
The Central Bank has published macroeconomic forecasts in each issue of its 
Monetary Bulletine, the first one in November 1999 and then each quarter from 2000 
to 2005. Since 2006 the Monetary Bulletin has been published three times a year. The 
                                                 
11 As discussed above the picture changes somewhat if 1994-2002 is used as a reference.  18
first forecasts were prepared by NEI. The first forecast prepared by specialists at the 
bank was published in the 2002/4 issue of the Monetary Bulletine. Because so few 
observations are available on forecasts made by the CBI staff we will consider the 
forecasts published by the CBI independently of which institution actually prepared 
the forecast. 
In terms of available information the forecasts for the coming year published in 
the third quarter are roughly equivalent to NEI’s forecasts that were published in the 
National Budget and the forecasts for the current year published in the first quarter are 
roughly equivalent to NEI’s forecasts that were published in the National Economy. 
Table 4.1 shows some statistics on the errors in the forecasts of changes in GDP 
made at different points in time. The first forecast was prepared in the third quarter in 
the previous year and the last in the fourth quarter of the present year when available 
information includes national accounts data for the two first quarters. 
As in the previous sections forecast errors are always the difference between the 
relevant forecast and the most recent estimate of the variable by Statistics Iceland. It is 
to be expected that in the future there will be some revisions of data used in this 
paper, especially of the most recent estimates. 
 
Table 4.1 
Errors in forecasting changes in GDP in year t       
Time  of  Average   P-value  Rank   RMSFE/  RMSFE/ 
forecasting  error (%)  RMSFE  one-tail  sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. Stdev.  GNI 
(t-1)Q3  -1.231 2.221 0.094  10 0.458 0.901  0.866 
(t-1)Q4  -1.436 2.321 0.038 4 0.478 0.942  0.905 
tQ1  -1.755 2.146 0.004 0 0.442 0.871  0.837 
tQ2  -1.305 1.938 0.023  15 0.399 0.786  0.755 
tQ3  -1.502 1.684 0.021 6 0.347 0.683  0.657 
tQ4  -1.449 1.815 0.005 0 0.374 0.736  0.708 
 
The table is based on seven observations (2001-2007) on errors in forecasts 
published in the third quarter of the previous year ((t-1)Q3). There are six 
observations (2000-2005) on errors in forecasts published in the third quarter in the 
current year as we treat the change in the frequency of the publication of the Monetary 
Bulletin that took place in 2006 as a drop in the third quarter publication. There are 
eight (2000-2007) observations on forecasts published at the other points in time 
within the year. 
In all cases the average errors are negative and it is noteworthy that these errors 
don’t seem to decrease as time passes and more information is gathered. Other  19
indicators of forecasting accuracy like RMSFE, Theil’s U2 and normalised RMSFEs 
show that later forecasts which are based on more information are better as is to be 
expected. 
If there are six observations then the critical value for one-tailed Wilcoxon’s rank 
sum test is 2 when α = 0.05. When there are seven observations the critical value is 3 
and it is 5 when there are 8 observations. This shows that in spite of very few 
observations the negative bias in the forecasts are significant in three out of six cases. 
As noted above the (t-1)Q3 (third quarter of the previous year) forecasts are 
comparable to NEI’s forecasts in the National Budget. The statistics on forecast errors 
reported in Table 4.1 indicate large improvements compared to NEI’s forecasts during 
1981-2002 (see Table 3.1 above). There is also an improvement if CBI’s forecasts are 
compared to NEI’s forecasts for the period 1994-2002. But if CBI’s forecasts are 
compared to those that NEI did for the period 1995-2002 the average error (-1.23 vs. -
1.33), RMSFE (2.22 vs. 1.99), Theil’s U2 (0.46 vs. 0.48) and normalised RMSFEs 
(0.90 and 0.87 vs. 0.88 and 0.88) are similar. 
Comparing CBI’s tQ1 (first quarter of the year that the forecast applies to) 
forecasts to NEI’s forecasts in the National Economy indicate similar forecasting 
accuracy in terms of average error (-1.76 vs. -0.53), RMSFE (2.15 vs. 1.63), Theils U2 
(0.44 vs. 0.39) and normalised RMSFEs (0.87 and 0.84 vs. 0.72 and 0.72). 




Errors in forecasting changes in private consumption in year t   
Time of  Average    P-value  Rank    RMSFE/ 
forecasting  error (%)  RMSFE  one-tail  sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. 
(t-1)Q3  -1.444 4.204 0.219  16  0.667  0.854 
(t-1)Q4  -0.908 3.696 0.262  15  0.586  0.751 
tQ1  -1.546 3.567 0.122  18  0.566  0.724 
tQ2  -0.902 3.449 0.248  13  0.547  0.700 
tQ3  -0.795 2.155 0.243  7  0.342  0.438 
tQ4  0.035 1.128 0.532  20  0.179  0.229 
 
The table shows that the forecasts improve as time passes and more information 
becomes available. Comparing the (t-1)Q3 forecasts in Table 4.2 to the NEI’s 
forecasts for changes in consumption in the National Budget for the period 1995-2002 
shown in Table 3.3 above shows that NEI’s forecasts were somewhat better during 
this short period of time. If we compare CBI’s forecasts  with NEI’s forecasts for  20
1981-2002 CBI’s forecasts are better. The average errors are negative in all cases but 
not significantly so in the shorter periods. 




Errors in forecasting changes in public consumption in year t    
Time of  Average    P-value  Rank    RMSFE/  RMSFE 
Forecasting  error (%)  RMSFE  one-tail  sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. rand.  walk 
(t-1)Q3  -1.173 1.550 0.025  13  0.417  1.324  1.438 
(t-1)Q4  -1.005 1.274 0.006  8  0.343  1.088  1.357 
tQ1  -1.118 1.407 0.005  7  0.378  1.202  1.016 
tQ2  -1.018 1.311 0.007  8  0.352  1.119  1.110 
tQ3  -0.888 1.230 0.067  10  0.331  1.051  1.129 
tQ4  -0.693 1.364 0.081  3  0.367  1.165  1.319 
 
The table shows that there is strong evidence of a negative bias in forecasting of 
goverment consumption. This bias is significant on usual signicance levels according 
to the t-test but not quite signifcant according to the rank-sum test. Theil’s U2 shows 
that the forecasts are much better than forecasting zero growth every time. It is 
worrying that forecasting accuracy does not seem to improve much as time passes and 
more information becomes available. 
The RMSFE standardised with the standard deviations of the variable is greater 
than unity indicating that forecasting constant growth near the average growth is 
better than CBI’s forecasts. The last column in Table 4.3 shows RMSFEs when the 
most recent change in growth in government consumption known at the time of 
forecasting is used as a forecast. The RMSFEs from this forecasting method, which is 
optimal if the growth follows a random walk process, are actually lower than the 
RMSFEs of CBI’s forecasts, except for the forecasts made in the fourth quarter of the 
previous year. 
CBI has published forecasts for the components of fixed investments. Table 4.4 




Errors in forecasting changes in business fixed investments in year t   
Time  of  Average   P-value  Rank   RMSFE/ 
forecasting  error, %  RMSFE  one-tail  sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. 
(t-1)Q3  -12.707  18.778 0.046  12 0.637 0.645 
(t-1)Q4  -13.109  18.174 0.014  15 0.616 0.624 
tQ1  -5.303 9.870 0.068  11 0.335 0.339 
tQ2  -5.053 8.916 0.056  11 0.302 0.306 
tQ3  -1.724 3.862 0.196  8 0.131 0.133 
tQ4  -3.690 6.653 0.061  10 0.226 0.228 
 
The table shows that even if the average errors are large and frequently significant 
or nearly significant, these errors decline as time passes and more information 
becomes available and both Theil’s U2 and standardised RMSFE are well below unity. 




Errors in forecasting changes in residential housing investments in year t 
Time  of  Average   P-value  Rank   RMSFE/ 
forecasting  error, %  RMSFE  one-tail  sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. 
(t-1)Q3  -6.432 7.715 0.011  6 0.612 2.091 
(t-1)Q4  -7.465 8.914 0.002  0 0.707 2.416 
tQ1  -4.303 9.284 0.104  9 0.736 2.516 
tQ2  -3.853 7.549 0.080  3 0.599 2.046 
tQ3  -4.245 4.719 0.019  6 0.374 1.279 
tQ4  -4.278 5.553 0.008  0 0.440 1.505 
 
The table shows that there is evidence of significant negative bias in the forecasts. 
There is also surprisingly small improvements in the forecasts over time. Theil’s U2 is 
well below unity indicating good forecasts but standardised RMSFE is well above 
unity indicating that the forecasts are not that good. When the variable that is 
forecasted is growing very fast, as is the case with residential housing investment 
here, Theil’s U2 comparison with zero growth makes it unsuitable as a measure of 
forecasting accuracy. 




Errors in forecasting changes in public investments in year t    
Time  of  Average   P-value  Rank   RMSFE/ 
forecasting  error, %  RMSFE  one-tail  sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. 
(t-1)Q3  -1.920  20.600 0.419  18 1.210 1.161 
(t-1)Q4  -6.464  21.760 0.219  14 1.278 1.226 
tQ1  -7.877  21.980 0.172  14 1.291 1.239 
tQ2  -6.814  22.344 0.212  22 1.313 1.259 
tQ3  -3.660  19.037 0.361  11 1.118 1.073 
tQ4  -6.052  19.284 0.205  12 1.133 1.087 
 
The table shows that the errors are large and  hardly decreasing over time but not 
significantly biased. Both Theil’s U2 and standardised RMSFEs are well above unity. 
As Theil’s U2 is above unity forecasting that the change in government investments 
was always zero would have resulted in better forecasts than CBI’s forecasts in terms 
of RMSFE. 




Errors in forecasting changes in fixed investments in year t    
Time  of  Average   P-value  Rank   RMSFE/ 
Forecasting  error, %  RMSFE  one-tail  sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. 
(t-1)Q3  -8.888  12.830 0.041  12 0.644 0.680 
(t-1)Q4  -11.029  13.963 0.006  15 0.701 0.740 
tQ1  -6.129 8.928 0.021  6 0.448 0.473 
tQ2  -4.892 7.902 0.038  20 0.397 0.419 
tQ3  -2.843 4.285 0.089  4 0.215 0.227 
tQ4  -4.660 6.200 0.010  0 0.311 0.328 
 
The table shows that there is evidence of significant negative bias in the forecasts. 
It also shows that the forecasting accuracy improves over time and that both Theil’s 
U2 and standardised RMSFE are well below unity. Comparing the accuracy of CBI’s 
forecasting in the third quarter of the previous year to similar forecasts by NEI for 
1995-2002 in Table 3.3 above show that the CBI’s  forecasts are somewhat better in 
terms of RMSFE and much better in terms of Theil’s U2 and standardised RMSFE.
12 
Table 4.8 show errors in CBI’s forecasting of changes in the national expenditure. 
 
                                                 
12 It is, of course, possible to argue that during 2001-2007 an unusually large parts of fixed investments 
were known in advance. The same is true for the latter part of the 1995-2002 period.  23
Table 4.8 
Errors in forecasting changes in national expenditure in year t   
Time  of  Average   P-value  Rank   RMSFE/ 
forecasting  error (%)  RMSFE  one-tail  sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. 
(t-1)Q3  -2.794 4.179 0.049  11 0.520 0.620 
(t-1)Q4  -3.091 4.352 0.016  6 0.541 0.646 
tQ1  -2.409 3.337 0.014  6 0.415 0.495 
tQ2  -1.847 2.930 0.034  4 0.364 0.435 
tQ3  -1.208 1.772 0.081  3 0.220 0.263 
tQ4  -1.291 1.668 0.007  8 0.207 0.248 
 
There is evidence of significant negative bias in the forecasts but the accuracy 
improves over time and both Theil’s U2 and standardised RMSFE are well below 
unity. 
Table 4.9 shows indicators of accuracy in forecasting of changes in exports. 
 
Table 4.9 
Errors in forecasting changes in export in year t     
Time  of  Average   P-value  Rank   RMSFE/ 
forecasting  error, %  RMSFE  one-tail  Sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. 
(t-1)Q3  -1.826 5.920 0.244  8 0.704 0.898 
(t-1)Q4  -1.283 5.558 0.275  7 0.661 0.843 
tQ1  -2.583 5.715 0.111  10 0.680 0.867 
tQ2  -1.864 3.970 0.101  1 0.472 0.602 
tQ3  -2.335 2.452 0.011  6 0.292 0.372 
tQ4  -2.508 5.296 0.099  8 0.630 0.803 
 
The table shows some evidence of negative biases. It also shows some 
improvements in forecasting accuracy as time passes, except for the forecasts made in 
the fourth quarter of the present year. This is though largely because of a very large 
error in the forecast for 2007. The forecasts in the two last quarters of the previous 
year and in the first quarter of the present year are fairly poor both according Theil’s 
U2 and standardised RMSFEs. 
Comparing forecasts made in the third quarter of previous year in Table 4.9 to 
similar forecasts made by NEI during 1995-2002 and shown in Table 3.3 above show 
that measured by Theil’s U2 and standardised RMSFE CBI’s forecasts are better.  
Both NEI and CBI used estimated equations to forecast some components of   
export while large parts were forecasted exogenously from the catch quotas that have 
been determined in advance and from the planned production of aluminium and ferro-
scilicon.  
Table 4.10 shows indicators for accuracy in CBI’s forecasts of changes in imports.  
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Table 4.10 
Errors in forecasting changes in import in year t     
Time  of  Average   P-value  Rank   RMSFE/ 
forecasting  error (%)  RMSFE  one-tail  sum  Theil's U2  Stdev. 
(t-1)Q3  -5.859 8.574  0.044  4 0.635 0.716 
(t-1)Q4  -5.697 8.333  0.021  3 0.617 0.696 
tQ1  -4.685 6.914  0.022  3 0.512 0.578 
tQ2  -3.754 7.002  0.068  2 0.519 0.585 
tQ3  -1.931 4.598  0.211  1 0.341 0.384 
tQ4  -2.129 4.246  0.085  3 0.315 0.355 
 
There is clear evidence of significant negative biases in the forecasts, but the 
forecasts improve over time. RMSFE in the third quarter of the previous year, (t-
1)Q3, is almost the same as in NEI’s forecasts for 1995-2002 shown in Table 3.3 
above. Both Theil’s U2 and standardised RMSFE are well below unity and somewhat 
lower than those for NEI’s forcasts for 1995-2002. 
To complete the picture we report in Table 4.11 the correlation coefficients 
between errors in forecasting of the different variables.  
 
Table 4.11 
  Correlations coefficients of forecast errors:     
  GDP  C G I X  M  C+G+I 
GDP  1.000 0.464  -0.412 0.010 0.809  -0.012 0.078 
C  0.464 1.000  -0.378 0.163 0.225 0.631 0.594 
G  -0.412 -0.378  1.000 -0.472 -0.086 -0.278 -0.418 
I  0.010 0.163  -0.472 1.000  -0.521 0.757 0.861 
X  0.809  0.225 -0.086 -0.521  1.000 -0.428 -0.432 
M  -0.012 0.631  -0.278 0.757  -0.428 1.000 0.971 
C+G+I  0.078 0.594  -0.418 0.861  -0.432 0.971 1.000 
 
The correlation between errors in forecasting of imports and consumption is quite 
high but still a lot lower than in Table 3.4 above which shows the correlations of 
errors in NEI’s forecasts. The correlation between errors in forcasting of imports and 
investments is also high but a bit lower than the same correlation in NEI’s forecasts. 
The correlations between consumption and invesments is quite low (0.163) while it is 
quite high in NEI’s forecasts (0.730 when forecasts for 1995-2002 are considered).  
Table 4.12, finally, reports the covariances of the forecast errors: 
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Table 4.12 
  Covariances of forecast errors:      
 GDP  C  G  I  X  M  C+G+I 
GDP  4.125 4.009  -0.979 0.220 9.961  -0.174 0.553 
C  4.009  18.112  -1.885 7.248 5.790  18.943 8.818 
G  -0.979 -1.885  1.371 -5.774 -0.613 -2.291 -1.707 
I 0.220  7.248  -5.774  109.126  -33.007  55.768  31.363 
X 9.961  5.790  -0.613  -33.007  36.718  -18.285  -9.116 
M  -0.174 18.943 -2.291 55.768 -18.285  49.683  23.858 
C+G+I  0.553  8.818 -1.707 31.363 -9.116 23.858 12.155 
 
 
5. Errors in first releases of national account data from Statistics Iceland 
 
In the previous section the errors in the forecasts were always the differences between 
the most recent figures from Statistics Iceland and the forecasts. When analysing 
forecast errors it is important to remember that data from Statistics Iceland tend to 
change over time, and usually they increase. There are considerable differences 
between the actual changes in macroeconomic variables used in Felixson and 
Gudmundsson (1988) and those used in the present paper. Even if Katrín Ólafdsóttir 
(2006) is a very recent paper the estimates of the actual changes of the variables used 
in her paper are different from those used in this paper. It is therefore quite probable 
that the figures for 2007 that we have been using here as “final data” will be revised at 
some later date. 
It is possible to measure the accuracy of the first releases of data from Statistics 
Iceland in the same way as we have been measuring the accuracy of the forecasts 
from the NEI and the CBI by treating the first releases as forecasts. The outcomes for 
the period 2000-2006 are shown in Table 5.1. 
The table shows that the negative biases in the first releases of data on changes in 
GDP and in national expenditures are close to being significant at the 5% level. In 
most cases both Theil’s U2 and standardised RMSFE are well below unity and it is 
very low in the case of private consumption and imports. But there are some noteable 
exceptions: changes in residential housing investments and changes in government 
investments score quite high on Theil’s U2 even if they are well below unity and for 
residential housing investments the RMSFE/Stdev. is almost 2 indicating that 
forecasting constant growth near the actual average growth over the whole period 
would have produced much better forecasts than the first releases. 
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Table 5.1 
  "Errors" when first figures from Statistics Iceland are used for forecasting 
 Average    P-value Rank Theil's RMSFE/ 
 error  (%) RMSFE one-tail  sum  U2  Stdev. 
GDP  -0.942 1.564 0.057  4 0.314  0.589 
National  exp.  -0.727 1.526 0.116  1 0.178  0.233 
Private  consumption  -0.005 0.484 0.491  22 0.074  0.091 
Public  consumption  -0.393 1.347 0.242  7 0.357  1.070 
Business  investments  -4.191 8.577 0.110  10 0.286  0.317 
Residential housing inv.  -3.337  8.097  0.155  17  0.646  2.045 
Public  investments  -0.152  12.488 0.489  11 0.689  0.652 
Gross  fixed  investments  -2.997 7.195 0.152  2 0.350  0.412 
Export  -0.731 1.719 0.147  14 0.295  0.371 
Import  -0.430 1.076 0.163  9 0.075  0.087 
 
As can be seen by comparing data in Table 5.1 to data in Table 4.5 above the 
forecasts of residential housing published by CBI during the latter half of the year 
were better forecasts of the final data in terms of Theil’s U2 and RMSFE/Stdev. than 
the first releases from Statistics Iceland published few months after the year for which 
the growth in residential investment is to be forecasted. 
That the first releases of output (GDP) are negatively biased seems to be in line 
with what can be observed in other countries (see e.g. Öller and Ballot, 1999). Aruoba 
(2005) finds that revisions to national account data for the US depend on the state of 




For much of the discussion above it is necessary to keep in mind that it was based on 
few observations. In such situations small changes in the sample, even the inclusion or 
exclusion of one observation, may have large influence on the results. Much of the 
discussion was in terms of analysis and comparisons involving NEI’s forecasts for the 
period 1995-2002. We pointed out that we did this knowing that NEI’s forecasting 
performance in 1994-2002 was substantially worse than during the 1995-2002 period. 
We have shown above that there have been some improvements over time in 
forecasting of changes in GDP and private consumption in Iceland. The RMSFE of 
NEI’s forecasting for GDP and private consumption is substantially lower for the 
period 1995-2002 than in earlier periods. These forecasts also score better on Theil’s 
U2 and marginally better on the RMSFE/St.dev. measure. 
We noted that in earlier periods NEI’s forecasts prepared in March/April of the 
year were surprisingly often no better than forecasts made 6 months earlier. This 
anomalie disappears in later periods.  27
For export and import no improvement can be seen and the forecasting of 
investment had actually higher RMSFE in 1995-2002 than in earlier periods. As the 
volatility was also higher in 1995-2002 there are only small differences in 
RMSFE/St.dev. 
Forecasts for changes in GDP and private consumption published by the CBI for 
2000-2007 at similar time as the forecasts that NEI made in September in the previous 
year were found to be roughly as good as NEI’s forecasts for the period 1995-2002. 
As time goes on and more information becomes available CBI’s forecasts of these 
variables improve. 
Comparing forecasting of changes in investment, export and imports by NEI in 
1995-2002 to those published by CBI for 2000-2007 seems to give CBI’s forecasts an 
advantage. 
In most cases CBI’s forecasts improve as time goes on and more information 
becomes available as is to be expected. There are though some exceptions to this rule. 
There is no improvement in the forecasts for changes in government consumption and 
government investments between forecasts made in the third quarter of the previous 
year to the fourth quarter of the year that the forcast applies to. We also showed that 
using the last known growth rate in government consumption at the time of 
forecasting as forcast for next year’s growth in government consumption improves on 
the actual forecasts published by the CBI. 
We documented negative errors in the first releases of macroeconomic data from 
Statistics Iceland. For changes in GDP the negative bias was practically significant (p-
value 5.7%) even if the observations are very few. The analysis showed that in the 
case of changes in government consumption and government investments there are 
large errors in forecasting when first releases of data are used as forecasts of “final” 
data. The forecasting performance of the first releases of data on residential housing 
investments was also poor. 
It is worrying that there is a clear and statistically significant bias in economic 
forecasting of GDP in Iceland. The same tendency can be observed in most 
forecasting of macroeconomic variables in Iceland. NEI’s forecasts have this negative 
bias as well as CBI’s more recent forecast. It is not difficult to point to some reasons 
why public institutions like the CBI and the NEI might make negatively biased 
forecasts. It has e.g. been their policy not to include large scale investments until they 
been approved by the government and Parliament. These investment are usually  28
known earlier and it would therefore have been possible to improve the forecasts by 
including an estimate of these investments, possibly with a wheight indicating the 
probability that they are approved by the authorities and implemented. It is also 
difficult for public institutions to have completely independent views on declarations 
by governments on the growth of government consumption and government 
investments or if the catch will exceed the allocated quotas and official estimates of 
catches outside of the quota system. Forecasting of wages can also be a sensitive issue 
in macroeconomic forecasts perpared by institutions that are important economic 
actors as well. It seems reasonable to expect that all these restrictions contribute to 
making the forecasts of changes in GDP lower than they would otherwise be and so 
create a negative bias in the forecasting. Assumptions that the exchange rate and the 
policy rate are unchanged or change relatively little during the forecast horizon can 
also have contributed to the bias. In principle assumptions of unchanged exchange 
rate or unchanged policy rate should not necessarily produce biases in the forecasts 
but they may though do so if the sample is small, covering one business cycle or only 
a part of one. The periods that we have focussed on, 1995-2002 and 2000-2007 are 
period of mainly fast growth where both the policy rate and the exchange rate could 
be expected to increase.  
Some of the arguments above should be relevant for forecasting in other countries 
than Iceland. Biases in forecasting seems though to be an exception rather than the 
rule in other countries. Öller and Barot (1999) test for bias in forecasting of changes 
in GDP in 21 OECD countries and find a signficant bias in only 2 cases and Anderson 
et al. (2007) do not find evidence of bias in forecasting of changes in GDP in Sweden 
by two public institutions and a private institution. Timmermann (2006) analysis IMF 
forecasts for a large group of countries and finds more evidence for positive bias than 
for negative bias, especially in the third world. Elliott et al. (2008) find some evidence 
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